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In this paper a case of organizational change is cited from empirical sources and reanalyzed as a failure case
of IT-enabled radical organizational change. It is argued that managements mechanical, Tayloristic
philosophy of organizational change are the primary causes of the failure. We maintain that successful
organizational change requires a more human-centered view of organizations and information systems. 
Introduction
Reengineering movement started in the early 1990s (Morgan, 1997). But business processes have been with us at least since the
mid-1940s and process emphasis really goes back to Frederick Taylor (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994), who advocated scientific
management. Hammer and Champy (1993) viewed BPR as the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
“processes” to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost and speed. They
further viewed it as the single best hope for restoring competitive advantage. Similarly, Davenport and Stoddard (1994) defined
it as a powerful change approach that can bring about radical improvements in business processes. 
However, it has been reported that 50-70% of all BPR efforts have failed (Hall et al., 1993; Hammer, 1995; O’Neil and Sohal,
1999). This high rate is a significant meaning with respect to not only economic sense but also social and  cultural sense, since
radical organizational changes often create downsizing, layoffs, mistrust between management and employees, people’s emotional
trauma, losing sense of identity at work, and many other societal impacts. 
In this paper, a case – JLS Office Supplies - of organizational change (Putnam, 1990) is cited and the case is reanalyzed as a fail
case of IT-enabled radical organizational change. There could be many different explanations about the high failure rate. We
recognize as the key problem management’s Tayloristic managerial philosophy, mechanistic view of organization, transmission
view of communication, functionalistic view of culture, and Tayloristic view of information systems. In what to follow, we
introduce the company background and the reengineering processes. Then we discuss the issues identified in JLS case.    
Organizational Change Initiatives  Reengineering
Company Bckground
Jones, Lowell, and Smith (JLS) is a family-owned office-supply firm with the 70-year-old history as one of the largest office
supply dealers in U.S., currently having 50 employees. The company is a customer-oriented, top-quality firm handling –
“everything for the office” - supplies that range from pencils and paper clips to original artwork and executive desks. The clients
of this medium-volume business in the marketplace are primarily small businesses including law firms, banks, and dentists’
offices. In the industry the company has a reputation as pioneering firm because of its innovative programs: sales team training
program and establishing an interior design department and a new office-supply order system. Although it is an uncommon
practice in the industry, JLS maintains several weeks of training for all sales people. JLS is one of the first office-supply firms
to establish an interior design department. 
Motivation of Reengineering
The former president, Smith, was a shrewd businessman and his employees respected and admired him. But he left the company
with outmoded methods, a loss of revenue, and the pressures of severe competition in the marketplace.  The current president,
Harry, realized that the marketplace has changed rapidly. The young, progressive firms that have the latest technology and
Chae/Social Shaping of Organizational Change
2001  Seventh Americas Conference on Information Systems 1829
innovative marketing methods have emerged and threatened the company’s competitive position in the industry. Thus, there was
a strong pressure on increasing efficiency in order to obtain and sustain competitive advantage.   
Process of Reengineering
The current president enacted this situation with a number of changes in company policies and in the duties of several
administrators. First, the president has made plans to develop and use a computer system to place orders, maintain accounts, keep
inventory, and purchase supplies. A new comptroller, Tom, a MBA from Harvard, was hired to design and manage that system
in a cost-efficient manner. Among changes in policies, the company plans to concentrate on large-account customers and phase
out clientele who spend less than $10 per month or $100 per year. For billing cost reduction and better estimates of monthly sales,
a system of contract sales that delineate the terms of payment between the customer and sales representatives was adopted. The
company eliminated the entertainment fund that sales personnel used to purchase gifts, meals, or provide entertainment for
prospective and long-term customers. 
Implementation 
The president announced its reengineering initiatives in a memo and then reviewed them in a company-wide meeting. In the
meeting he commented,
Although we are currently competitive  we cannot remain competitive with them unless we increase
efficiency, cut costs, and reorient our focus to tomorrows innovations. Changes in company policies and
procedures are absolutely essential.  I can assure you that these changes are absolutely essential at this time
 if you have concerns about the new policies, please bring them to me or to members of the operations
committee. The operations committee will meet next week to process reactions and make suggestions for
implementing these changes (Putnam, 1990)
The president did not inform his employees about the severe financial difficulty that the company had faced. But he shared the
financial problem with Bill, his vice-president (VP) and general manager, and with Tom, the comptroller. At the following week,
there was the operations committee meeting. The committee was comprised of six elected members who served 1-year terms and
who met with Bill, the VP. The elected members were Sam, Alice, and Harvey from the sales department,  Susan from design,
and Judy and Fred from the supply department. The operations committee was established 5 years before to review problems and
to make recommendations for improving task operations in sales and supply departments.  Committee recommendations were
sent to the executive committee, the decision making body of the company, comprised of the president, VP, comptroller, and the
three managers from each department. 
Bill, the VP, typically ran the meeting. But this time the president and VP decided not to attend the meeting, since they were afraid
of the situation that members would raise voices against the reengineering plan. Instead they asked Sam, the most senior of the
elected members, to chair the meeting and provide them with constructive recommendations for making the reengineering plan
work. Sam supported management but wanted committee members to express their opinions about the reengineering, to prepare
for the future uncertainty, and to support the new policies. As expected, the result of the meeting was a lot of complaining about
the reengineering process. Members pointed out the problems about ways of implementing the changes and with the new policies.
Also, they raised their negative reactions to ways the  comptroller has implemented the reengineering and practiced his power.
The results of the meeting were reported to the president that changes were taking place too rapidly and rigidly for members of
the operations committee. He recommended more communication between management and employees. The president, after
meeting with the VP and comptroller, sent out several memos supporting the changes and reengineering processes, justifying strict
enforcement of the new policies, and announcing efforts to ease the transition. But employees continued to be non-cooperative
with management and the changes.
Result of Reengineering
One month later 15 members in the sales department found jobs in new office-supply firms. There was no time to declare “failure”
of the reengineering. Two month later the company declared bankruptcy and closed its doors. The loss of key sales personnel and
the inability to recover from its financial problems were attributed to its downfall.
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Discussion
The loss of sales personnel and the inability to recover from its financial problems might be the “direct” causes of its downfall.
However, this case study is much more complex than that. Noticeably, the reengineering initiatives brought several significant
changes to JLS in terms of organizational culture, employees’ perception of leadership, their attitude toward the company in
general, etc. All these changes negatively affected its situation and actually made the problem worse. After the implementation
of the reengineering, for example, employees felt that CEOs are less humane nowadays than before and formal communication
between management and employees has broken down lately. Compared to the early days’ family-like culture, the culture after
the reengineering became bureaucratic and Tayloristic.
This case highlights many common problems faced during the redesigning of business processes and organizational policy
changes such as poorly formulated strategy, flawed objects, insufficient knowledge about the IT, and employees’ resistance to
change (Sutcliffe, 1999; O’Neill and Sohal, 1999). Especially, as Morgan (1997) pointed out, many radical organizational changes
place primary emphasis on the design of technical “business system.” As a result, the majority of reengineering programs
mobilized all kinds of social, cultural, and political resistance that undermined their effectiveness. JLS would be a good example
of this “technical” approach to organizational change without properly considering non-technical, human factors. In this section,
we review more fundamental problems with this company and identify the five fundamental issues – management philosophy,
leadership, lack of communication, culture and conflict, IT as a magic bullet .
Management Philosophy 
One of the key success factors in organizational change is a managerial philosophy (Miles, et al., 1995). Typically, there are two
distinct philosophies of management and organization: mechanistic and humanistic. A mechanistic philosophy has been deeply
influenced by scientific management or Taylorism and views organizations as machines. This approach overemphasizes the role
of management, while limiting the development of human capacities and molding employees to fit the requirements of mechanical
organization (Morgan, 1997). Also it views the role of information technology as “automation and efficiency” for high
productivity. On the other hand, a humanistic philosophy recognizes human roles as the central in organizing and develops the
requirements of any changes based on human activity systems. Thus, its position on the role of information technology is
fundamentally different from its counterpart. It insists that the role of information technology is not automating of process but
informating people (Zuboff, 1988).  
JLS’s management had a rather mechanistic philosophy of management and organization. According to a mechanistic approach,
managers should do all the thinking relating to the planning and design of work, leaving the workers with task of implementation
(Morgan, 1997). It appears that JLS’s management viewed organizational change as a dependent variable and the introduction
of a new computer system, the new comptroller and new policy changes as independent variables. The president simply expected
employees to follow these reengineering initiatives. He set the requirements and tried to mold employees to fit these changes.
Furthermore, he simply believed that changes in existing policies and processes through automation will “cause” increases in
efficiency and consequently organizational competitive advantage. He exactly followed the principle of scientific management:
separating the planning and design of work from its execution. Organizational decision-making was centralized to management
only. Employees were viewed as those who are subject to execute or follow the decisions made by management. The new
comptroller had a mechanistic philosophy of management too. His rigid management style made many employees annoyed. He
is the one who made the matter worse. Overall, the Tayloristic design philosophy of organizational change led management
reinforce top-down approach to the redesigning processes and policy changes and ignore many human factors (e.g., culture,
employees emotions, existing practices).  
Leadership
Many researchers recognize the critical role of leadership in the reengineering initiatives (Sutcliffe, 1999). Without proper and
committed leadership, organizational changes are very likely to fail. For radical organizational change the leader requires
transformational leadership (Bass, 1985) and especially in the implementation phase committed leadership is critical for success
(Davenport, 1993). A transformational leader articulates a realistic vision of the future that can be shared, stimulates employees
intellectually, and pay attention to the differences among the employees (Yammarino and Bass, 1990). Also he tends to advent
flattened hierarchies and employee empowerment (Schuster, 1994). 
On the other hand, JLS’s management failed to recognize more fundamental problems (e.g., employees’ mistrust about
management and resistance to new policies and the new computer system) the company had faced and instead blindly enforced
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to implement the changes in policy and process. Also management did not have clear visions for the company’s future. What they
only concerned about was “increase efficiency.” For transformational leadership a leader must  see his organization as a social
system, which consists of individuals trying to cope with the sweeping changes in their lives due to radical organizational changes
and the potential for low morale in their work-place as a result (Hammer and Champy, 1993). For this a leader has to possess
systems outlook (Senge, 1990) and see the whole picture of the reality. 
Noticeably, in addition, in the case there are the breakdowns of leadership. The new comptroller who was hired to manage the
new computer system and to redesign the work processes took over a significant power from the president and practiced it over
employees. Instead the president who used to receive respect and trust from employees moved back to the second line. This was
another significant problem, when we consider that many failures of reengineering stem from the breakdowns in leadership
(Hammer and Champy, 1993). In the operations committee meeting, one of the members told a story about her frustration about
the breakdown of leadership. 
During the transition period I had already agreed to take one of my customers to dinner and a hockey game
before the policy on expense funds was enacted. Reservations had been made. The total cost of the evening
would be about $21. I explained the circumstances to the president and asked him to chip in $10. He said he
couldnt assist without checking with Tom. Now, when the president of a company cant make a decision for
a mere 10 bucks, something is wrong!  Tom is a power-hungry individual who wants to run JLS his way. He
believes in strict enforcement of the rules and seems to have no time for people. For example, once a customer
returned some merchandise and the salesperson misplaced the return slip. When the salesperson took the
merchandise back to the storeroom, Tom followed him and waited until he left, grabbed the merchandise, and
brought it to the president with the exclamation that sales personnel never follow the rules! Tom claimed that
sales people ought to know that a signed return slip must accompany an item before it is reshelved in the
storeroom
The comptroller’s power stemmed from formal authority, control of knowledge and information, and control of technology
(Morgan, 1997). Even though he was new, his formal position as the company’s comptroller legitimized his power. “Power
accrues to the person who is able to structure attention to issues in a way that in effect defines the reality of the decision-making
process. This draws attention to the key importance of knowledge and information” (Morgan, 1997, p. 179). The president shared
the important financial information with the comptroller and he was a member of the executive committee that was the decision-
making body of the company. Also the introduction of the computer system gave him a significant power. However, the
employees were very against his mechanistic management style and ways of exercising of power. Even some employees denied
recognizing legitimacy of the comptroller’s power. In the meeting one member from the supply group spoke,
Tom is an outsider who doesnt understand the traditions of this company. He treats employees as robots who
must first their job performance into 12-digit fields just like that damn compute 
Lack of Communication 
Many researchers see communication as the key organizational issue for organizational change. Davenport (1993) points out that
regular communication must be established between management or process innovation teams and those who will be affected
by the new process and sensitive issues must be addressed honestly and openly. Hammer and Stanton (1995) also see the
importance of communication for the reengineering and propose ten principles of communication for radical organizational
change: use multiple channels; honesty is the only policy; use emotion, not just logic; heal, console, encourage; listen, listen,
listen, etc.
This case illustrates how poor management’s view of communication is. Organizational change is such a big deal to  everyone
in an organization. But in this case management’s view of communication is the conduit metaphor of communication. In this
metaphor, communication is equated with transmission (Putnam, 1996) and just seen as a medium for the exercise of power
(Fairhurst, 2000). Management viewed employees as passive receivers of its message. It appears that management got confused
about the difference between communication and order. Thus, management failed to recognize that communication is dialogue
and a social construction of meaning rather than monologue and employees are coauthors of the message (Putnam, 1996;
Fairhurst, 2000). 
For example, the president never discussed changes in policies with employees in advance. Instead he announced these changes
in a “memo” and then reviewed them in a “company-wide meeting.” His transmission view of communication led him choose
such poor communication media (memo and company-wide meeting). However, drawn from social constructivist roots, the
metaphor of performance and symbol of communication see it as social interaction and interpretation of literary forms such as
narratives, metaphors, rites and rituals, and paradoxes respectively (Putnam, 1996). 
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From this interpretative perspective of communication, not only are these media lean with respect of media richness theory (Daft
and Lengel, 1986) but also they are weak at supporting two-way, open communication and social interaction. Larkin and Larkin
(1996) are warning that “Do not introduce the change to employees in a company publication” (e.g., memo) (p.97). Simply it is
untrustworthy and usually incomprehensible in the eyes of frontline employees. These mediums reinforce one-way communication
between management and employees and would result in increasing employees’ resistance to management and organizational
change. 
Also, management neglected the importance of feedback loop and organizational learning. Management became a closed system
having only top management (the president, VP, and comptroller) and isolated from the rest of the organization. The operations
committee meeting was the only channel for two way communication and feedback in the company. But most employees thought
the operations committee was ineffective because management rarely acted on its recommendations. Feedback is the process that
one element of experience influences the next (Morgan, 1997). However employees believed that the operations committee merely
functioned as a mechanism for employee input and feedback. Rather it was instrumental in the executive committee’s agenda.
Absence of open communication and feedback loop eliminated the chance of even single-loop organization learning to occur.
Also, radical organizational change requires “sustainable” double loop learning that questions the underlying assumptions of
theories-in-use (Argyris and Schein, 1978). For double loop learning, according to the logic of dialectic view of change (Morgan,
1997) positive conflict based on open communication is required. A number of management scholars (Leonard and Strauss, 1997;
Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1999) recognize that conflict is essential to successful organizational change and decision
effectiveness. However, without open and honest communication, mutual trust and respect conflict often goes to not positive but
negative, what we call negative conflict. 
In JLS case the president intentionally avoided facing with his employees who might have different opinions about new policies
and the new computer system. He decided not to attend the operations committee meeting and instead sent out “more” memos
supporting the changes and management’s positions. Because of its Talyoristic management philosophy, management did not
accept any disagreement from the employees. There is no clear indication that management “respected and trusted” its employees.
Rather management neglected employees’ emotion and opinions further created more mistrust and less communication and
feedback. This machine-like rigidity inhibited sustainable double-loop organizational learning  (Argyris and Schon, 1978) and
ultimately caused the firm’s downfall.  
Culture and Conflict
Many researchers recognize organizational culture as the most important issue for organizational change. Many authors suggested
that high failure rate of organizational change can be attributed to lack of understanding employee culture by top management
(Popoff and Brache, 1994). Thus, leaders must attempt to identify and protect organizational culture and values (Bell, 1997).
Organizational changes require far more than just attendance to new policies, skills, or behaviors. It completely changes not just
the processes and practices as individual employees but also their values, norms and beliefs (Lancaster, 1998). 
Especially, this case highlights the criticality of organizational culture and employees’ resistance to any attempt to attack the
organizational history of old images. Probably the biggest problem in JLS was management’s negligence and/or its functionalistic
view of organizational culture. Top management’s negligence of organizational culture would have stemmed from the issues (lack
of communication, traditional scientific management style, poor leadership) we have discussed so far. 
However, probably a more significant one was management’s functionalistic view of organizational culture. Organizational culture
can be referred to the broader patterns of an organization’s norms, values, and beliefs (Schneider et al., 1994) and can be
understood as the unique sense of place that is made up of several elements: metaphors, rituals, stories, heroes, cultural artifacts,
performance, and values (Trethewey, 1997). However, functionalistic perspective on organizational culture may see culture as
a variable that can be manipulated by individual managers to create a strong, effective, and competitive organization (Trethewey,
1997). Thus, management with functionalistic view of organizational culture prefers large meeting to close face-to-face contact
with employees and does not feel the need of being truly part of organizational members to understand the true nature of
organizational culture. Instead, they tend to try to manipulate organizational culture through their power and/or other management
techniques. For example, such management believes that new values, norms and beliefs can be delivered to employees through
large meetings. 
However, organizational cultures are more than a variable that can be easily manipulated. They are a system of shared symbols
and meanings (Trethewey, 1997). And the elements - narratives, rituals, myths, heroes, stories, etc. - of organizational culture are
not simply artifacts of cultures but instead they operate as a means of public persuasion, as ways of knowing, as options for
managing identities, and as political control” (Putnam, 1996, p. 129). This was exactly what happened in the operations committee
meeting. In that meeting employees created these literary forms (e.g., heroes, myths, stories, narratives) to construct and
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reconstruct the reality of organization and organizational culture. Further they actually used as a mechanism to attack
management’s rigid reengineering initiatives and to defend the organizational history. These stories, myths, and narratives
illustrate what employees’ values, norms, and beliefs are. Management’s transmission view of communication and functionalistic
view of culture led them constantly neglect the significance of these stories and narratives for  understanding the reality of the
organization as well as employees’ reaction to the reengineering initiatives and management. After all non-participatory and non-
cultural organizational change resulted in employees engaging in defensive routine (Argyris and Schon, 1996) and looking for
jobs with new office supply firms. It is more important to understand and be part of members’ cultures rather than simply attempt
to manipulate that as an outsider.
IT is a Magic Bullet?
In most cases of radical organizational changes a new computer system(s) is introduced for the purpose of automating existing
processes. Many organizations see the new computer system a magic bullet (Markus and Benjamin, 1997) for organizational
change and view organizational change as a technological change (Davenport, 1998). This rather technology deterministic view
often neglects the importance of social success factors for systems (Markus and Benjamin, 1996). Many studies have recognized
the problems with a mechanistic view of IT-enabled organizational change (Davenport, 1998; Markus and Robey, 1988; Markus
and Benjamin, 1997; Robey and Boudreau, 1999). JLS did exactly same thing for the same purpose. Management neglected the
“complexity” of implementing new technology in organization. 
The development process of the system did not include any user involvement and user training was poor. Orlikowski (1992) states
that technology has its dual nature as objective reality and as socially constructed product. She argues that (1) once  developed
and deployed, technology is reified and institutionalized, and loses its connection with human agents, and (2) this is caused mainly
by the fact that users are often excluded in the process of development and the processes of development and use are often done
in different organizations. Thus, the dualism of technology can be attributed for destroying the interpretative flexibility of
information systems (Kakola and Koota, 1999) and lack of feeling of ownership of the new computer system. Probably, the
comptroller is the only one who had ownership of the computer system.
In the operations committee meeting members told stories about problems with the rigidity of the new computer system and tried
to defend their practices.
Do you realize the complications that the computer systems has caused? Every invoice I complete must have
exactly 12 entriesnor more or no less. It takes me hours to check code numbers, rectify inconsistencies, and
fit each order into exactly 12 digits my customers say that they cant understand the codes  The automatic
reorder mechanism sometimes fails to place new orders or to reorder products before the present supply has
diminished  the new computer system had resulted in unnecessary inconvenience, inefficiency, and confusion
 why have a computerized purchase order and inventory system for a business in which only a few employees
really use it. Its quicker to do it without a computer
Even though the computer system might deliver precision, accuracy, speed, automation, and efficiency, they tended to view them
as rigidity and put more values on flexibility and defended their existing practices.  Most of people do not want their jobs fully
designed by someone else (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994). Workplace practices are situated and historical in nature (Schuman,
1987) and thus cannot be easily created by the introduction of new computer systems. But in JLS case non-participatory and non-
democratic design of the new computer system made it difficult for users (employees) to make senses of the new system and
processes that were created by it (Bjerknes and Bratteteig, 1995; Mumford, 1993; 1996). Management’s mechanistic or Tayloristic
view (e.g., separation of designing and use) of organization caused this kind of problem again. This resulted in increasing
employees’ resistance to top-down and IT-enabled organizational change.
Closing Remark
In this paper JLS case was seen as a failure of IT-enable radical organizational change. The case revealed that management had
neglected the complexity of organizational change and reinforced rigid organizational changes without considering many human
factors. Its negligence of many human factors during organizational change was attributed to management’s mechanistic view
of organization and communication which might be more fundamental causes of the firm’s downfall. 
Influenced by Taylor’s scientific management and Cartesian view of the world, still, many manager and leaders view an
organization as an “economic” system and information systems as “technical systems” or “appliances.” Further, they believe that
efficiency is the key source of competitive advantage and it comes solely from reducing cost and doing things “efficiently.” We
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believe that this tendency has created more problems rather than truly solve. Instead we argued that for successful change
organizations need a more human-centered view of management, leadership, communication, culture and conflict, and information
systems. 
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